A choice function is backwards‐induction rationalizable if there exists a finite perfect‐information extensive‐form game such that for each subset of alternatives, the backwards‐induction outcome of the restriction of the game to that subset of alternatives coincides with the choice from that subset. We prove that every choice function is backwards‐induction rationalizable.
MLA
Bossert, Walter, and Yves Sprumont. “Every Choice Function Is Backwards‐Induction Rationalizable.” Econometrica, vol. 81, .no 6, Econometric Society, 2013, pp. 2521-2534, https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA11419
Chicago
Bossert, Walter, and Yves Sprumont. “Every Choice Function Is Backwards‐Induction Rationalizable.” Econometrica, 81, .no 6, (Econometric Society: 2013), 2521-2534. https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA11419
APA
Bossert, W., & Sprumont, Y. (2013). Every Choice Function Is Backwards‐Induction Rationalizable. Econometrica, 81(6), 2521-2534. https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA11419
We are deeply saddened by the passing of Kate Ho, the John L. Weinberg Professor of Economics and Business Policy at Princeton University and a Fellow of the Econometric Society. Kate was a brilliant IO economist and scholar whose impact on the profession will resonate for many years to come.
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