We study a two‐player one‐arm bandit problem in discrete time, in which the risky arm can have two possible types, high and low, the decision to stop experimenting is irreversible, and players observe each other's actions but not each other's payoffs. We prove that all equilibria are in cutoff strategies and provide several qualitative results on the sequence of cutoffs.
MLA
Rosenberg, Dinah, et al. “Social Learning in One‐Arm Bandit Problems.” Econometrica, vol. 75, .no 6, Econometric Society, 2007, pp. 1591-1611, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0262.2007.00807.x
Chicago
Rosenberg, Dinah, Eilon Solan, and Nicolas Vieille. “Social Learning in One‐Arm Bandit Problems.” Econometrica, 75, .no 6, (Econometric Society: 2007), 1591-1611. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0262.2007.00807.x
APA
Rosenberg, D., Solan, E., & Vieille, N. (2007). Social Learning in One‐Arm Bandit Problems. Econometrica, 75(6), 1591-1611. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0262.2007.00807.x
We are deeply saddened by the passing of Kate Ho, the John L. Weinberg Professor of Economics and Business Policy at Princeton University and a Fellow of the Econometric Society. Kate was a brilliant IO economist and scholar whose impact on the profession will resonate for many years to come.
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