We prove the folk theorem for discounted repeated games under private, almost‐perfect monitoring. Our result covers all finite, ‐player games that satisfy the usual full‐dimensionality condition. Mixed strategies are allowed in determining the individually rational payoffs. We assume no cheap‐talk communication between players and no public randomization device.
MLA
Hörner, Johannes, and Wojciech Olszewski. “The Folk Theorem for Games with Private Almost‐Perfect Monitoring.” Econometrica, vol. 74, .no 6, Econometric Society, 2006, pp. 1499-1544, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0262.2006.00717.x
Chicago
Hörner, Johannes, and Wojciech Olszewski. “The Folk Theorem for Games with Private Almost‐Perfect Monitoring.” Econometrica, 74, .no 6, (Econometric Society: 2006), 1499-1544. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0262.2006.00717.x
APA
Hörner, J., & Olszewski, W. (2006). The Folk Theorem for Games with Private Almost‐Perfect Monitoring. Econometrica, 74(6), 1499-1544. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0262.2006.00717.x
We are deeply saddened by the passing of Kate Ho, the John L. Weinberg Professor of Economics and Business Policy at Princeton University and a Fellow of the Econometric Society. Kate was a brilliant IO economist and scholar whose impact on the profession will resonate for many years to come.
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