Michihiro, Kandori. “Randomization, Communication, and Efficiency in Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring.” Econometrica, vol. 71, .no 1, Econometric Society, 2003, pp. 345-353, https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0262.00398
Chicago
Michihiro, Kandori. “Randomization, Communication, and Efficiency in Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring.” Econometrica, 71, .no 1, (Econometric Society: 2003), 345-353. https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0262.00398
APA
Michihiro, K. (2003). Randomization, Communication, and Efficiency in Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring. Econometrica, 71(1), 345-353. https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0262.00398
We are deeply saddened by the passing of Kate Ho, the John L. Weinberg Professor of Economics and Business Policy at Princeton University and a Fellow of the Econometric Society. Kate was a brilliant IO economist and scholar whose impact on the profession will resonate for many years to come.
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