This paper examines a notion of coalitional fairness for exchange allocations. An allocation is "c-fair" if no coalition of traders could benefit from achieving the net trade of some other coalition. Properties of c-fair allocations are studied both in exchange economies with a finite number of traders and with an atomless sector.
MLA
Jaskold-Gabszewicz, Jean. “Coalitional Fairness of Allocations in Pure Exchange Economies.” Econometrica, vol. 43, .no 4, Econometric Society, 1975, pp. 661-668, https://www.jstor.org/stable/1913075
Chicago
Jaskold-Gabszewicz, Jean. “Coalitional Fairness of Allocations in Pure Exchange Economies.” Econometrica, 43, .no 4, (Econometric Society: 1975), 661-668. https://www.jstor.org/stable/1913075
APA
Jaskold-Gabszewicz, J. (1975). Coalitional Fairness of Allocations in Pure Exchange Economies. Econometrica, 43(4), 661-668. https://www.jstor.org/stable/1913075
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